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 This Article examines a specific policy issue that goes to the heart of the 
larger debate surrounding the changing employment relationship: How 
should the law of covenants not to compete adapt to the changing landscape of 
the U.S. labor market and to the increasing importance of a knowledge-based 
economy?  The author first argues that noncompete policy is of great impor-
tance to fostering economic growth and labor markets, and then discusses 
various theoretical approaches to noncompete enforcement in a knowledge 
economy.  The preferred approach, the author contends, is a hybrid model of 
selective enforcement that differentiates among workers as “creative” or 
“service” employees, thereby enhancing the positive spillovers gained from 
policies at the extremes of the enforcement spectrum. 
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In the abstract, the U.S. legal system is intended to be efficient, pro-
mote economic enterprise, and protect free markets where the “little guy” 
can work hard and turn a good idea into financial independence, even 
wealth, thereby adding to the nation’s economic prosperity.  If that is the 
case, why did two entrepreneurs in Seattle get sued when they tried to open 
a new business, started in a parent’s basement, to make it easier for small 
companies to meet their postal needs at the most competitive price?1  If 
those two men provided a better, more economical service, why did they 
have to spend an estimated $150,000 (plus an undisclosed settlement 
amount) to defend a lawsuit brought by their former employer, a large in-
ternational corporation, accusing them of poaching other employees and 
simply taking away a tiny portion of that company’s market share?  At the 
other end of the labor market is Carly Fiorina, the controversial and ousted 
former CEO of the pioneering Silicon Valley firm Hewlett-Packard Com-
 1. See Eve Tahmincioglu, Compete With Caution Against Past Employer, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 31, 
2005, at C7 (article about two former Pitney Bowes employees who were sued by the company after 
they left to start a similar business and hired some of their former colleagues). 
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pany.  In that case, what if Fiorina wanted to work immediately for one of 
HP’s top competitors or hire away her former HP executive assistant?  Why 
shouldn’t she be able to make those choices without the risk of being sued 
by HP?2 
In either instance, the ultimate question is, why would the U.S. legal 
system potentially support an employer’s attempt to restrict the livelihood 
and control the actions of a former employee?  The answer:  these individu-
als agreed in their employment contracts that they would not use confiden-
tial information gained from their employment, or for a limited time, com-
pete against their former employers.  They, or the other employees they 
hired away from the first company, signed agreements containing covenants 
not to compete that triggered liquidated damages and injunctive relief if 
they went to work for a competitor during the prohibited period.3  While 
there is little empirical research on the use of noncompetes, there are indica-
tions that such agreements are increasingly common4 and as a result this 
sort of post-employment restriction will influence the decisions of employ-
ers and employees. 
To further complicate the issue, each state has its own laws concerning 
covenants not to compete, which can cause problems for employers and 
employees who have business locations across the country.  The majority of 
jurisdictions do not clearly distinguish between different types of workers 
 2. See Hewlett-Packard Company Employment Agreement with Carleton S. Fiorina, July 17, 
1999, § 7, at 22-23 (titled “Noncompete; Non-Solicit”), available at 
http://contracts.corporate.findlaw.com/agreements/hp/fiorina.emp.1999.07.17.html (last visited Sept. 20, 
2006) (hereinafter Fiorina Employment Agreement).  Fiorina’s covenant not to compete prohibits her 
from, among other things, working for three companies on a “prohibited list” or soliciting Hewlett Pack-
ard employees for a period of 24 months.  Id.  Fiorina’s February 10, 2005, departure from HP also 
came with an estimated $21 million payment.  Paul R. LaMonica, Fiorina Out, HP Stock Soars, 
CNN/MONEY.COM, February 10, 2005, available at  http://money.cnn.com/2005/02/09/technology/ 
hp_fiorina/ (last visited Sept. 20, 2006). 
  Curiously, the agreement is, by its terms, interpreted under California law, which has declared 
such employment agreements as against public policy and unenforceable.  See infra note 19.  One sug-
gested explanation for including the noncompete provision is that Fiorina’s ownership stake in the com-
pany takes her out of the realm of a mere employee and endows her with the characteristics of an owner 
selling a business and agreeing not to compete, which is permissible under California law.  This does 
not, however, make sense based on a plain reading of the contract terms or even the circumstances of her 
departure.  To date the noncompete provisions of Fiorina’s employment contract do not appear to have 
been triggered by her post-employment actions.  Therefore, it is not clear what deterrence, if any, the 
employment contract has had on Fiorina’s post-employment activities. 
 3. See Tahmincioglu, supra note 1; Fiorina Employment Agreement, supra note 2. 
 4. See Tahmincioglu, supra note 1.  See also infra note 32 and accompanying text.  The single 
formal attempt to quantify the volume of noncompetes and their use is now over fifteen years old.  See 
Peter J. Whitmore, A Statistical Analysis of Noncompetition Clauses in Employment Contracts, 15 J. 
CORP. L. 483 (1990).  See also Gillian Lester, Restrictive Covenants, Employee Training, and the Limits 
of Transaction-Cost Analysis, 76 IND. L.J. 49, 49 (2001) (noting “[r]estrictive covenants are an increa-
singly common feature of employment, used across a wide range of industries, occupations, and em-
ployees,” and citing Whitmore, supra, while stating that she is “unaware of any empirical study directly 
measuring the prevalence of restrictive covenants in practice”). 
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based on their contribution to the economy,5 rather courts in a given juris-
diction are likely to treat a fired CEO the same as a departing salesperson 
for purposes of noncompete enforcement.6 
Outside of the covenant not to compete framework, employees tradi-
tionally have been categorized according to the tools of their respective 
trades.  Laborers have been distinguished from professionals, blue-collar 
workers from white-collar workers, and people in manufacturing jobs from 
those in service jobs.  Society has recognized differences between workers 
who toil in the fields, on the shop floor, or behind a desk in an office.  Other 
distinctions are based on whether workers passed the day using their hands 
or depended more heavily on their mental capabilities and formal education 
to earn a living.  Over time, the legal system adapted to those archetypes 
and created frameworks for treating workers as distinct based upon identifi-
able characteristics and job roles and labor regulation.  For example, the 
National Labor Relations Act addressed unions and child labor restrictions 
and wage and hour laws regulated working conditions for wage earners, 
while white-collar professionals were left largely unregulated—particularly 
at the federal level—when it came to how those workers contracted with 
their employers regarding the terms of employment.  In the United States, 
at-will sensibilities have prevailed with respect to white-collar profession-
als.7  For them the patchwork of state-level contract law has seemed suffi-
cient and crossover concerns like workplace discrimination, sexual harass-
ment, and the like were largely issues addressed on an individual, case-by-
case basis.  Individual states’ approaches to restrictive post-employment 
covenants have been dictated by absolutist preferences about individual, un-
restricted freedom of choice in employment8 and inherited from common 
law traditions.9 
 5. See generally COVENANTS NOT TO COMPETE, A STATE-BY-STATE SURVEY (Brian M. Mals-
berger ed., 2004).  The exception to prima facie equal treatment for all types of employees is Colorado.  
Colorado allows employment contracts to recover training costs for less than a two year period and per-
mits noncompetes for “executive and management personnel and officers and employees who constitute 
professional staff to executive and management personnel.”  COLO.  REV. STAT. 8-2-113(d) (2005). 
 6. There are indications that, over time, courts are more likely to enforce noncompete agreements 
regardless of the nature of the employee’s responsibilities, level of skill, or “value” to the firm.  As one 
federal court observed, 
Until the last several decades, courts exhibited great reluctance to enforce such covenants 
against employees whose services were not unique in some way.  This was true unless the em-
ployee had access to trade secrets or customer lists or could appropriate customer good will 
upon leaving his or her employment. 
Borg-Warner Protective Servs., Corp., v. Guardsmark, Inc., 946 F. Supp. 495, 500 (E.D. Ky. 1996) (re-
jecting arguments that Gap store security guards should not be bound by noncompetes because, in part, 
the court acknowledged Kentucky’s recognition of an employer’s investment in employee training). 
 7. Regardless of occupation, historically, at-will employment is a “distinctive aspect of American 
labor law” not present in other developed economies.  Clyde W. Summers, Employment At Will in the 
United States:  The Divine Right of Employers, 3 U. PA. J. LAB. & EMP. L. 65, 65-66 (2000). 
 8. See Ronald J. Gilson, The Legal Infrastructure of High Technology Industrial Districts:  Sili-
con Valley, Route 128, and Covenants Not to Compete, 74 N.Y.U. L. REV. 575, 613-19 (1999) (discuss-
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Now the focus of the U.S. economy is increasingly on the segment of 
the labor pool comprised of workers with some advanced education or pro-
fessional training.10  This is the case because the U.S. labor market is in the 
midst of a momentous shift away from labor intensive goods manufacturing 
toward knowledge-based service industries.11  The December 2005 version 
of a United States Bureau of Labor Statistics report summed up this trend:   
“The long-term shift from goods-producing to service-providing employ-
ment is expected to continue.  Service-providing industries are expected to 
account for approximately 18.7 million of the 18.9 million new wage and 
salary jobs generated [from 2004-2014].”12  This trend is at the root of the 
“knowledge-based economy” or “knowledge economy” that is discussed in 
this Article.  Essentially, the shift is away from manufacturing activities, 
which require interchangeable basic skills, and toward service activities, 
which require problem-solving skills based in formal education and train-
ing.13  Knowledge-based industries include both those that thrive on creat-
ing new knowledge or information, like high-tech software firms, and man-
agement consulting companies that use information and expertise to 
generate wealth by providing financial services, such as brokerage firms 
and investment banks.14  These classes of industries and the highly educated 
and skilled workers they employ underscore the United States’ comparative 
advantage over the primarily low-skill, manufacturing economies in the de-
veloping world.15 
ing the “serendipity” and “historical accident” of California’s adoption of an existing proposed legal 
code containing the strict prohibition of restraints on freedom of employment). 
 9. For a discussion of the long history of restrictive employment covenants beginning in Eng-
land, see Harlan M. Blake, Employee Agreements Not to Compete, 73 HARV. L. REV. 625, 625-46 
(1960). 
 10. See United States Department of Labor, Bureau of Labor Statistics, Occupational Outlook 
Handbook, Tomorrow's Jobs, available at http://www.bls.gov/oco/oco2003.htm (last modified Dec. 20, 
2005) (last visited Sept. 20, 2006) (projecting that the greatest increase in percentage change in wage 
and salary employment for the categories of education and health services” and “professional and busi-
ness services”).  See also id. Chart 4. 
 11. Id. 
 12. Id. 
 13. Id. 
 14. See, e.g., Ann C. Hodges & Porcher L. Taylor, III, The Business Fallout from the Rapid Obso-
lescence and Planned Obsolescence of High-Tech Products:  Downsizing of Noncompetition Agree-
ments, 6 COLUM. SCI. & TECH. L. REV. 3, 3-4 (2005) (discussing the transition to an information-based 
economy and noting that “in the high-technology industry in particular, technical knowledge and infor-
mation, along with the ability to creatively use such knowledge, forms the basis of innovation, increas-
ing the company’s ability to compete in the marketplace”); see generally Rafael Gely & Leonard Bier-
man, The Law and Economics of Employee Information Exchange in the Knowledge Economy, 12 GEO. 
MASON L. REV. 651 (2004) (focusing on the impact of the knowledge economy on employment law). 
 15. See, e.g., Jane Morse, U.S.-China Labor Issues Generate Strong Emotions:  Employment Is-
sues Affect Specific U.S. Sectors, Industries, U.S. Department of State International Information Pro-
grams Article Series, available at http://usinfo.state.gov/eap/Archive/2005/Mar/29-848102.html (last 
visited Sept. 20, 2006).  But see Aaron Bernstein, Shaking Up Trade Theory, BUSINESS WEEK, Decem-
ber 6, 2004, available at http://www.businessweek.com/magazine/content/04_49/b3911408.htm (dis-
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As the U.S. manufacturing economy has evolved into a service econo-
my, the internal employment practices of workplaces have also changed.  In 
the past, internal labor markets16 within firms often promised lifetime em-
ployment for loyal workers.17  However, assumptions about lifetime em-
ployment at a single firm have changed.  To the contrary, commentators 
now recognize that the U.S. economy and labor market are forced to adapt 
to the new globalized economy in which attracting educated foreign work-
ers (sophisticated human capital) to the United States is crucial to economic 
growth.18  By necessity employers, employees, and the law have to deal 
with these roiling trends. 
This Article looks at a specific policy issue that goes to the heart of the 
larger debate surrounding the changing employment relationship:  How 
should the law of covenants not to compete adapt to the changing landscape 
of the U.S. labor market?  As it stands now, a wide range of state-level ap-
proaches are used to balance the interests of mobility, protecting goodwill, 
and other goals employees and their employers address with covenants not 
to compete (“CNCs” or “noncompetes”).  On one end of the CNC enforce-
ment spectrum, a handful of states effectively ban all covenants not to com-
pete regarding employment relationships.19  On the other end, and through 
most of the middle, states enforce CNCs that conform to whatever their in-
dividual public policies have deemed as reasonable restraints on trade.20  
cussing recent disputes over the traditional view of a U.S. comparative advantage over “low skill” jobs 
in developing countries) (last visited Sept. 20, 2006). 
 16. See generally J.E. KING, LABOUR ECONOMICS 75 (2d ed. 1990). 
 17. See Katherine V. W. Stone, Knowledge at Work:  Disputes Over the Ownership of Human 
Capital in the Changing Workplace, 34 CONN. L. REV. 721, 725-26 (2002).  Professor Stone’s argu-
ments concerning these shifts are discussed in Part III of this paper.  See also Peter Capelli, Market-
Mediated Employment:  The Historical Context, in THE NEW RELATIONSHIP:  HUMAN CAPITAL IN THE 
AMERICAN CORPORATION 67-68 (MARGARET M. BLAIR & THOMAS A. KOCHAN, eds., 1999). 
 18. See, e.g. Michael Mandel, The Trade Deficit vs. Human Capital, BUSINESS WEEK, May 9, 
2005, available at http://www.businessweek.com/bwdaily/dnflash/may2005/nf2005059_0127.htm (last 
visited Sept. 20, 2006) (discussing the positive effects of immigration on the U.S. economy and the im-
portance that incoming human capital); The Great Jobs Switch, THE ECONOMIST, Oct. 1, 2005 (arguing 
that the loss of manufacturing jobs in the United States and Western Europe is occurring because those 
“economies are healthy not sick” and that “developed economies’ comparative advantage is in know-
ledge-intensive activities, because they have so much skilled labour”). 
 19. The most noted and studied example is California’s long tradition of banning employment 
covenants not to compete on public policy grounds.  Articles focused on California’s notoriety for ban-
ning noncompetes and the implications include, for example, Gilson, supra note 8; Alan Hyde, The 
Wealth of Shared Information:  Silicon Valley’s High-Velocity Labor Market, Endogenous Economic 
Growth, and the Law of Trade Secrets, Sept. 1998, http://andromeda.rutgers.edu/~hyde/wealth; and Tait 
Graves, Nonpublic Information and California Tort Law:  A Proposal for Harmonizing California's 
Employee Mobility and Intellectual Property Regimes Under the Uniform Trade Secrets Act, 2006 
UCLA J. L. TECH. 1 (2006).  The other state with a near complete ban is North Dakota.  See John 
Dwight Ingram, Covenants Not to Compete, 36 AKRON L. REV. 49, 66 (2002).  However, not all restric-
tive covenants in North Dakota are banned.  Reasonable noncompetes with regard to the sale of the good 
will of a business are permissible.  Id. 
 20. Brian Kingsley Krumm, Covenants Not to Compete:  Time for Legislative and Judicial Reform 
in Tennessee, 35 U. MEM. L. REV. 447, 472-73 (2005) (“Although a small number of states have not 
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Ultimately, there is no simple, “one-size-fits-all” approach to covenants not 
to compete.  To address the discrepancies in enforcement this Article out-
lines the main considerations that state lawmakers should weigh in develop-
ing noncompete policies that are responsive to and promote the burgeoning 
knowledge-based economy. 
Part II of this Article argues that CNC public policy is an important 
component of the modern employment relationship and illustrates how the 
legal system should adapt to the challenges that relationship presents to pol-
icy makers evaluating the effects of noncompetes.  Next, Part III explains 
three theoretical perspectives on covenants not to compete—two grounded 
in law and economics and one based on ethical concerns surrounding hu-
man capital ownership—and sheds light on the debate over the propriety of 
restrictive covenants in an employment context. 
Part IV argues that, within these approaches, there are consistent, 
common implications for categorizing workers in an information economy 
as “service” or “creative” employees for CNC enforcement purposes.  Ac-
cordingly, Part IV explains those terms in this context.  Part V demonstrates 
that, within the service and creative job categories, CNCs can be selectively 
enforced to create positive spillovers and maximize useful knowledge trans-
fers.21 
Part VI provides three models for how the interests outlined in the pre-
vious sections can be balanced by utilizing a service employee and creative 
employee distinction when evaluating CNCs arising in the modern labor 
addressed this issue or have not formally adopted a rule, the vast majority of states apply the ‘rule of 
reasonableness’ or some variation, when reforming the geographical and temporal restraints of a cove-
nant not to compete”) (citing Malsberger, supra note 5 extensively). Two such high-profile examples of 
states that allow reasonable enforcement are New York and Massachusetts.  See, e.g., Dan Messeloff, 
Note, Giving the Green Light to Silicon Alley Employees:  No-Compete Agreements Between Internet 
Companies and Employees Under New York Law, 11 FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L.J. 711, 
711-723 (2001); Christine M. O’Malley, Note, Covenants Not to Compete in the Massachusetts Hi-Tech 
Industry:  Assessing the Need for a Legislative Solution, 79 B.U. L. REV. 1215 (1999). 
 21. As discussed in this Part III and Part V, in particular, this Article describes knowledge transfer 
as a “spillover.”  The concept of spillovers—the externalities or side effects of actions—is used 
throughout this Article to describe the unintentional consequences of employee mobility or restrains on 
that mobility.  The knowledge transfer that is a side effect of employee mobility is a positive spillover 
when it comes to innovation in the high-tech sector.  The same spillover can also have negative effects, 
for instance in a service sector business like the financial services industry where confidential informa-
tion is important and employers have an interest in keeping client information proprietary by prohibiting 
former employees from using that information to gain an unfair competitive advantage. 
The concept of knowledge spillovers and transfers as part of noncompete policy and enforcement has 
been discussed by T. Leigh Anenson, The Role of Equity in Employment Noncompetition Cases, 42 AM. 
BUS. L.J. 1, 54 (2005) (arguing that an enforcement analysis “be industry-specific in order to best assess 
the benefits of knowledge spillover, incentives for innovation, and whether economic efficiencies may 
be outweighed by other interests”); and Barak D. Richman, Essay:  Firms, Courts, and Reputational 
Mechanisms:  Toward a Positive Theory of Private Ordering, 104 COLUM. L. REV. 2328, 2360 (2004) 
(concluding that in Silicon Valley, California the high-tech business culture provided an “emphasis on 
openness [that] generated positive spillovers from innovation, a more efficient labor market, and a re-
duced time-to-market period for many new technologies”). 
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market and within a knowledge economy context.  In doing so, Part VI ar-
gues that states should clarify—and codify—their CNC policy to maximize 
the efficient tendencies of CNCs while alleviating concerns that noncom-
petes can harm workers and hinder human capital investment, mobility, and 
other positive spillovers.  Finally, the Article concludes that states can 
achieve greater clarity in CNC policy and enforcement by crafting a care-
fully articulated public policy that provides guidance to the courts, as well 
as employers and employees. 
Before continuing, it is appropriate to pause to clarify what is meant by 
a covenant not to compete within the context of this Article.  These agree-
ments are formal contracts between employers and employees concerning 
post-employment restrictions on employee activities.  This Article will refer 
to such agreements as “covenants not to compete,” “noncompetes,” or 
simply “CNCs.”22 
Noncompete agreements are a popular contractual tool used by em-
ployers to restrict an employee’s post-employment ability to work for a 
competitor or start a competing enterprise.  The agreements also may pro-
tect other valuable information such as trade secrets (beyond protections al-
ready offered by existing trade secret laws).  Other forms of noncompetes 
address issues of refraining from competition after the sale of a business or 
non-solicitation agreements related to poaching clients or employees.23 
These covenants may be a clause in a larger employment contract or a 
stand-alone agreement that an at-will employee signs as a condition of em-
ployment (or continued employment).  Noncompetes are distinguishable 
from noncompetition agreements regarding the sale of goodwill of a busi-
ness and from the common law or statutory protections for an employer’s 
trade secrets.  However, the interaction and overlap of trade secret protec-
tion with CNC concerns will be discussed in the context of CNC policy 
throughout the Article.  For the most part, the archetypal noncompete 
agreement discussed herein will be the stand-alone sort that is ancillary to 
other employment terms and conditions.24  Unless otherwise discussed, I 
will proceed as if these agreements are valid contracts, duly negotiated and 
free from defects, and that they are freely entered without unlawful duress, 
fraud, or mistake.  The assumption is that these agreements are supported 
 22. They are also often called “noncompete agreements,” “restrictive covenants” or “noncompeti-
tion agreements.” 
 23. See generally Malsberger, supra note 5 (addressing the coverage of noncompetes across the 
states, including instances of additional post-employment restrictions on former employees such as the 
sale of a business when the seller can agree not to impair the transferred goodwill by refraining from 
competition within a reasonable scope). 
 24. Oftentimes these agreements are also concerned with expanding by contract (or simply restat-
ing) the common law of trade secrets so as to solidify the employer’s protections and put the employee 
on notice that the employer wants to protect specific interests.  The noncompetes discussed in this paper 
are concerned with restricting an employee’s post-employment activity, essentially to limit unfair com-
petition against the former employer.  These agreements often will provide for liquidated damages upon 
breach, in because damages from impermissible competition are difficult to calculate. 
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by sufficient consideration for the relevant jurisdiction.  In other words, the 
focus here will be on the public policy implications of allowing or curtail-
ing noncompetes, not on the potential problems inherent in any type of con-
tract. 
II. 
WHY NONCOMPETE POLICY MATTERS 
Noncompete policy has an important relationship to human capital in-
vestment and, as a result, to the value of a company’s work force and the 
firm’s ability to acquire and protect its knowledge-based property and busi-
ness goodwill (in the sense of a firm’s intangible value beyond tangible as-
sets25).  Noncompete policy is also relevant because, on a global scale, the 
shift away from goods-producing in developed countries continues to put 
greater emphasis on the United States’s position as the leader in attracting 
highly educated workers from around the globe.26  This positive inflow of 
human capital from new foreign workers entering the United States has 
been estimated at roughly $200 billion each year.27  Accordingly, any pub-
lic policy, like that concerning covenants not to compete, that can maintain 
and enhance America’s ability to capitalize on human capital is important to 
future economic growth
While the corporate world has been forced to adjust to (or perhaps em-
brace) the new employment dynamic of highly skilled, mobile workers, the 
law has been slow to develop any overarching rules to regulate changing 
aspects of the employment relationship.28  This lack of uniformity is partic-
ularly apparent with regard to covenants not to compete.  The American 
Law Institute’s (“ALI”) recent work on creating a Restatement on Employ-
ment Law is an official recognition that employment law in this country is 
unwieldy, in part due to differences across states.29  Interestingly, the ALI 
chose to focus one of the initial four sections of its forthcoming Restate-
ment solely on noncompetes.30  There are also indications that the frequen-
 25. BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (Bryan A. Garner, ed. 1996) (defining goodwill as “[a] business’s 
reputation, patronage, and other intangible assets that are considered when appraising the business, es-
pecially for purchase”). 
 26. See Mandel, supra note 18.  Mandel argues that the current large trade deficits experienced by 
the United States are, in fact, greatly offset by increases in U.S. human capital—particularly technology-
based expertise—due to worker immigration. 
 27. Id. 
 28. Gely & Bierman, supra note 14, at 651-52. 
 29. See generally Matthew W. Finkin, Second Thoughts on a Restatement of Employment Law, 7 
U. PA. J. LAB. & EMP. L. 279 (2005). 
 30. Id. 
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cy of employment disputes, in general, has risen31 and covenants not to 
compete have become common in employment contract
Employers are aware that the quality of a business’s employees is an 
inescapable component of a business’s success and is worth fighting to pro-
tect.33  Business efficiency and profitability are driven by effective hiring, 
training, and retention of productive employees.  Investors, too, realize that 
the value of many corporations is not fully reflected on their balance sheet.  
This is because the value of many of today’s companies, particularly high-
tech companies and other knowledge-based industries, is tied up in the cre-
ative services provided by the human capital of their employees, not by 
physical assets that can be owned, sold, or leveraged.34  It is then no sur-
prise that employers and investors want assurance that their investment in 
talented employees is secure.35  This is especially true when employees 
might leave the firm, strike out on their own, and compete with the firm that 
helped them develop valuable skills in the first place. 
What, then, can frustrated employers do on behalf of concerned inves-
tors to secure costly—and indispensable—investments in valuable em-
ployees?  Possible solutions include expensive yet-to-vest stock options, 
other delayed compensation, or encouraging employee ownership.  The 
more popular solution, however, is the covenant not to compete:  a contract 
that purports to stop an employee from competing with his or her employer 
once the relationship ends, for a “reasonable” time and under “reasonable” 
conditions.36 
In any covenant not to compete there are at least two parties—the em-
ployee and the employer—and, as with any contract, there are concerns 
about enforceability.  With CNCs, however, the varied public policy ap-
 31. Stone, supra note 17, at 764.  See also Whitmore, supra note 4; Lester, supra note 4. 
 32. See Eric Posner et. al, Investing in Human Capital:  The Efficiency of Covenants Not to Com-
pete 1 (2004) (University of Virginia John M. Olin Program in Law and Economics Working Paper Se-
ries, Working Paper No. 11), available at http://law.bepress.com/ uvalwps/olin/art11 (last visited Sept. 
20, 2006). 
 33. See, e.g., Stone, supra note 17, at 722 (“As firms and employees have come to recognize the 
enormous value of employee human capital, disputes over ownership of human capital have in-
creased.”). 
 34. See Gely & Bierman, supra note 14, at 660 (discussing the knowledge economy, and arguing 
that “knowledge” has “become the key ingredient of economic activity” and “the increased importance 
of knowledge is twofold—knowledge becomes more important as a component of the production 
process, and also as a product itself”). 
 35. See, e.g., John Roberts & Eric Van den Steen, Shareholder Interests, Human Capital Invest-
ment and Corporate Governance (April 30, 2000) (Stanford GSB Working Paper No. 1631), available at 
http://ssrn.com/abstract=230019 (discussing the importance of firm-specific human capital and the need 
to protect human capital through governance mechanisms) (last visited Sept. 20, 2006). 
 36. See Ingram, supra note 19, at 49 (commenting that assumptions of lifetime employment are 
outdated and that “increased mobility has added greatly to the opportunities of workers, but it has also 
created serious problems for employers who want to protect their trade secrets, confidential information, 
and goodwill” and that “to accomplish this protection, many employers require at least some of their 
employees to agree [to certain post-employment restrictions]”). 
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proaches among the fifty states can lead to wildly different outcomes for the 
interested parties depending on the state where enforcement is sought.37  
Employment contract law has traditionally been the province of the states.  
Accordingly, the vagaries of state-level enforcement have caused uncertain-
ty regarding employee contract enforcement, particularly as businesses 
draw from an increasingly mobile workforce.38  If there are fifty different 
systems of enforcement, how is an employee or an employer to know what 
to expect in each case, especially when it is not obvious what public policy 
each state is trying to promote?  While it is not clear if the CNC policy of 
any given state is closely correlated to a conscious policy goal,39 it is clear 
that states are interested in promoting knowledge-based industries impacted 
by CNC policy.40 
The practical business concerns about increasing and securing valuable 
human capital, such as preventing the loss of trade secrets and proprietary, 
confidential information have long been important.  However, with the ad-
vent of a knowledge economy, how the law addresses the issue of human 
capital is more relevant to employers and employees than it has been in the 
past.  Because of that increased emphasis on human capital protection and 
investment, a state’s policy on noncompete enforcement must address the 
tension between knowledge-intensive industries and a mobile workforce. 
III. 
THE THEORETICAL PERSPECTIVES ON 
NONCOMPETES AND HUMAN CAPITAL 
Since the first known reported covenant not to compete case in 1711, 
there has been a debate in the legal literature about agreements that restrict 
employees’ post-employment activities that he or she would otherwise be 
free to undertake.41  This Part is about the propriety of enjoining a former 
 37. See, e.g., Application Group, Inc. v. Hunter Group, Inc., 61 Cal. App. 4th 881 (1998) (uphold-
ing a trial court’s refusal to enforce a Maryland noncompete because of California’s public policy 
against such agreements). 
 38. See, e.g., id. 
 39. For example, California’s much-discussed ban on covenants not to compete with regard to 
employment was not enacted in response to a policy problem per se, rather, it is a quirk of history.  See 
Gilson, supra note 8, at 613-19 (noting that California’s ban on noncompetes resulted from historical 
serendipity due to the wholesale adoption of the “Field Code” when the state entered the United States). 
 40. Examples of this include Michigan’s “Cool Cities” initiative, free land to new residents in 
some Kansas communities, and other recent college graduate retention efforts in places like Philadel-
phia.  Jay Rey & Stephen Watson, Keeping the Best and Brightest, THE BUFFALO NEWS, May 28, 2005 
(discussing the efforts of various regions in the United States to retain and attract young, educated work-
ers).  Any policy impacting human capital like that concerning CNCs should be of keen interest to 
these—often old economy—rust belt states like Michigan and Ohio that are feeling the effects of nega-
tive population growth and struggling with waning manufacturing economies. 
 41. See Blake, supra note 9, at 625-46 (discussing the history of noncompetes in the common 
law); see also Messeloff, supra note 20, at 711-723 (discussing the common law noncompete develop-
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employee from competing against an employer, even when pursuant to a 
valid contract.  The question is one of balancing, on one hand, the terms of 
a contract that is on its face a restraint on trade, and on the other hand, con-
cerns about protecting an employer’s goodwill and investment in an em-
ployee’s human capital.42 
There are three cogent, general approaches to CNCs in the recent aca-
demic literature.  The first derives from a classic law and economics, prop-
erty rights, and contract analysis.  This perspective argues that CNCs are an 
efficient tool to encourage and protect an employers’ investment in human 
capital.43  A second group of commentators believe that CNCs stifle inno-
vation by favoring overreaching employers at the expense of employee mo-
bility and attendant knowledge spillover.44  Specifically, they argue that the 
absence of CNC enforcement in California has been crucial in the heigh-
tened level of labor mobility inherent in the high-tech agglomeration econ-
omy of Silicon Valley.  The third critique is a consequentialist argument 
that CNCs are undesirable because they restrict a worker’s freedom to 
maintain exclusive control over his or her own labor.45 
For the first and second arguments the desired outcome is to facilitate 
or restrict knowledge spillovers.  Both employ law and economic analysis 
to make their assertions, but the critical policy evaluation is dependent on 
the stance taken toward information availability.  In contrast, the third ar-
gument is, by definition, concerned with an outcome favorable to workers’ 
freedom and self-determination, and it illuminates public policy concerns 
that legislatures and courts must consider.  These normative theories are 
useful in evaluating the virtues and vices of CNCs and in addressing the 
human capital concerns discussed above, particularly because it is unclear 
what states are seeking to accomplish with CNC policy.  This is, in part, be-
cause the broad landscape of U.S. noncompete policy is only covered in 
piecemeal, industry or jurisdiction-specific articles46 or catalogued in a few 
treatises.47 
ments in Britain and the United States).  With the bursting of the “dot-com” bubble around the time the 
article was published, in hindsight some of Messeloff’s exuberance is less persuasive. 
 42. This general balancing of interests standard is consistent with the most used approach to eva-
luating a challenged covenant not to compete.  See, e.g., BDO Seidman v. Hirshberg, 93 N.Y.2d 382, 
388-89 (1999).  Although noncompetes are disfavored restraints on trade, 
[t]he modern, prevailing common-law standard of reasonableness for employee agreements 
not to compete applies a three-pronged test.  A restraint is reasonable only if it:  (1) is no 
greater than is required for the protection of the legitimate interest of the employer, (2) does 
not impose undue hardship on the employee, and (3) is not injurious to the public. 
Id. (citations omitted) (emphasis original). 
 43. See infra note 62 and accompanying text. 
 44. See generally Gilson, supra note 8; Hyde, supra note 19. 
 45. See Stone, supra note 17. 
 46. E.g., Frank J. Cavico, “Extraordinary or Specialized Training” as a “Legitimate Business 
Interest” in Restrictive Covenant Employment Law:  Florida and National Perspectives, 14 ST. THOMAS 
L. REV. 53 (2001); Marcus A. McDaniel, An Alternative to California’s Prohibition on Noncompete 
Clauses, 27 LOS ANGELES LAWYER 25 (2004); Krumm, supra note 20 (surveying the law of various 
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In addition, in Part III.C. below, where the second argument concern-
ing employee mobility is addressed, the mobility theory will be discussed 
using the Silicon Valley example in light of California’s ban on noncom-
petes.  This is because it is acknowledged that California’s policy of non-
enforcement, as embodied in Business and Professions Code Section 
16600,48 is a useful model for analyzing the potential impact of noncompete 
policy,49 and as such it will provide a useful context for the discussion of 
employee mobility in a knowledge economy. 
There has been relatively little analysis of the details of the policy 
goals of individual states, particularly in terms of a cross-state comparison.  
This Article analyzes public policy goals inherent in representative ap-
proaches to noncompetes, but does not categorize jurisdictions by the 
strength of their enforcement.50  With that information in hand the Article 
then addresses the connection between the states’ economic interests and 
their public policy of enforcement.  Part VI proposes three public policy 
models that states should evaluate in light of individual economic concerns, 
concluding that each state has unique business interests in CNC enforce-
ment that should drive a closely tailored public policy approach. 
A. A Brief Economic Analysis of the Underpinnings of  
Noncompetes and Human Capital 
Over the last few decades several commentators have made the con-
nection between noncompetes and the distinction between specific and gen-
eral human capital investment.51  There is also a growing literature on the 
possible impact of the enforcement (or abolishment) of noncompetes on la-
bor markets.52  While many commentators utilize the general and specia-
states); William M. Corrigan & Michael B. Kass, Non-Compete Agreements and Unfair Competition—
An Updated Overview, 62 J. MO. B. 81 (2006) (Missouri); Todd M. Foss, Texas, Covenants Not to Com-
pete and the Twenty-First Century:  Can the Pieces Fit Together in a Dot.Com Business World? 3 
HOUS. BUS. & TAX L.J. 207 (2003). 
 47. The most cited state noncompete reference texts are:  Malsberger, supra note 5, and KURT H. 
DECKER, COVENANTS NOT TO COMPETE (2d ed. 1993 & Supp. 2004). 
 48. At first glance California’s approach to noncompetes is rather simple:  it has banned them 
since 1872.  That provision states in full:  “Except as provided in this chapter, every contract by which 
anyone is restrained from engaging in a lawful profession, trade, or business of any kind is to that extent 
void.”  CAL. BUS. & PROF. CODE § 16600 (2005).  See also, Hyde, supra note 19, at Section III; Gilson, 
supra note 8. 
 49. See Gilson, supra note 8, at 613-19 (also noting that California’s ban on noncompetes results 
from historical serendipity). 
 50. The author’s research in this regard is ongoing.  It is relevant to note that there is no uniform 
approach in the academic literature on how to gauge a state’s strength of noncompete enforcement. 
 51. The first appears to be in an article by Paul H. Rubin & Peter Shedd, Human Capital and Co-
venants Not to Compete, 10 J. LEG. STUD. 93 (1981), applying the general and specific human capital 
distinctions developed by economist Gary Becker.  See GARY S. BECKER, HUMAN CAPITAL (3d ed. 
1993). 
 52. See Rubin & Shedd, supra note 51; see also Eric A. Posner & George G. Triantis, Covenants 
Not to Compete from an Incomplete Contracts Perspective (Sept. 2001) (Chicago Working Paper Series, 
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lized training framework to understand noncompetes, there remains much 
disagreement on the propriety of enforcing noncompetes and the degree to 
which they should be enforced.  In this section the Article begins to address 
different types of human capital because these differences lie at the heart of 
a policy analysis of noncompetes. 
In the broadest sense, human capital “refers to the acquired skills, 
knowledge, and abilities of human beings.”53  Moreover, 
[u]nderlying the concept is the notion that such skills and knowledge in-
crease human productivity, and that they do so enough to justify the costs 
incurred in acquiring them.  It is in this sense that expenditures on improv-
ing human capabilities can be thought of as ‘investments.’54 
Specific human capital is an individual employee’s earning potential and 
skills that are only useful in a specific work situation—essentially they are 
non-transferable, firm-specific skills that are not valuable to a third party 
(i.e., another employer).55  An example of specific skill training is when an 
employer invests in training an employee on how to navigate that particular 
employer’s filing system.  In this instance the skill of understanding that 
particular filing system is not useful to another employer (leaving aside the 
fact that the employee could develop some general filing acumen). 
In contrast, general human capital is characterized by broadly useful 
skills that are transferable to other jobs.56  General human capital is most 
often developed by the individual (for instance through obtaining a profes-
sional degree) and is likely paid for by that person.57  However, when an 
employer trains an employee in general skills, the rational employer often 
asserts that it has a stake in that increased human capital now possessed by 
the worker.58  That claim is partially based on assumptions that:  (1) the 
general skills were provided at the employer’s expense; (2) the employee is 
now a more knowledgeable, valuable worker; and (3) the employee started 
the job at a lower wage than if he or she had already acquired the requisite 
Law & Economics Working Papers, No. 137), available at 
http://www.law.uchicago.edu/Lawecon/index.html (last visited Sept. 20, 2006). 
 53. Lester M. Salamon, Why Human Capital? Why Now? in HUMAN CAPITAL AND AMERICA’S 
FUTURE:  AN ECONOMIC STRATEGY FOR THE ’90S 3 (David W. Hornbeck & Lester M. Salamon eds., 
1991). 
 54. Id. 
 55. Richard Posner succinctly states the general law and economics definition of the two kinds of 
human capital: 
Economists distinguish between two types of human capital (earning capacity).  One is general 
human capital; the other is firm-specific human capital…[w]orkers who develop skills that are 
specialized to a particular employer are more productive employees of this employer that they 
be of any other.  They possess firm-specific human capital. 
RICHARD A. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW §11.4, at 358-59 (5th ed. 1998).  See also Lester, 
supra note 4, at 65-71 (discussing Rubin & Shedd and human capital analyses of noncompetes). 
 56. Lester, supra note 4, at 65-71. 
 57. Id. 
 58. See Stone, supra note 17, at 723. 
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skills.  Thus, the employer has made an investment in the worker59 and, be-
cause indentured servitude and owning another’s labor are forbidden, a 
noncompete may be an employer’s only recourse to ensure that the em-
ployee does not take her now-increased general human capital and go work 
for a competitor at a higher wage.60 
The last concern essentially leads to a multiple insult from the depart-
ing employee.  If the employee is imbued with value transferred from the 
first employer and freely takes it to a second employer, then the first em-
ployer is, arguably, doubly harmed.  First it loses out on some of the return 
on its investment in the employee and has to start training a new person (or 
paying more to hire an experienced one).  Second, it is harmed because the 
employee is now aiding a competitor by capitalizing on the very human 
capital the first firm “paid” to develop.  Moreover, that competitor reaps the 
reward of hiring a trained employee without investing in training.  Even if 
the new employer pays a higher wage, that employer realizes savings by 
avoiding the monetary and opportunity costs of training, as well as elimi-
nating the uncertainty of training an employee who might not remain at the 
firm long enough to repay the training costs.  In economic terms, the mar-
ginal product of the human capital (i.e., the employee) is increased at the 
expense of the first employer.61  The incentive structure for this turn of 
events is built in:  An employee will move between firms to maximize her 
wages and the “poaching” firm will want to maximize the quality of its hu-
man capital stock at the expense of other firms.  Alternatively, the trained 
employee could simply leave and start a competing business on her own, 
thus also reaping an unfair advantage at the expense of the former employer 
who underwrote the general training. 
Since this natural market incentive structure tends to harm the interests 
of employers who invest in general human capital, it is no surprise that 
those firms face a series of difficult decisions.  First, what is the value of the 
general skills to the firm for carrying out its profit-maximizing goals?  Can 
the firm live without those skills in its employees?  The answers here will 
depend on a firm-level cost-benefit analysis that weighs the relative advan-
tages of investing in, or acquiring access to, those generalized skills.62 
 59. See Cavico, supra note 46 (arguing that courts should fully recognize generalized training as a 
protectable employer interest). 
 60. See generally, Posner & Triantis, supra note 52.  Posner and Triantis argue from a Chicago 
School law and economics perspective that noncompetes can be economically efficient when the em-
ployer has financed the employee’s general skills where the employee could not acquire the skills with-
out the employer and the employee thus accepts a lower wage to, in effect, allow the employer to gain 
back the investment.  This is because otherwise an employer cannot protect against an employee acquir-
ing the general skills and then leaving with his or her increased human capital and going to work for a 
third party that is willing to pay more for the already-acquired skills. 
 61. See, e.g., Rubin & Shedd, supra note 51, at 97. 
 62. As a threshold matter, increasing human capital—particularly general human capital—
provides both individual and aggregate societal benefits.  See BECKER, supra note 51. 
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Once the firm decides to invest in accessing that human capital, a 
second issue arises.  Should the firm, to the extent the labor market allows, 
invest in training existing employees with valuable general skills, given the 
risk of losing those employees to a competitor before the investment is re-
couped?  Alternatively, should the employer hire employees who already 
possess the general skills required (assuming they are available in the labor 
market and the wage they demand affordable)?  The answer to the first 
question of whether it is “efficient” to acquire that sort of human capital 
turns on the efficiency related to the “product” the firm produces.63  The an-
swer to the second question depends on the nature of the skills available for 
hire in the marketplace.  From the employer’s perspective, it is a good in-
vestment to develop firm-specific skills because there is no market to hire 
from and there are no competitors interested in hiring away the firm’s em-
ployees for their specific skills.  In sum, from a firm’s perspective, it is a 
risk to invest in an employee’s general skills. 
For the employee it is desirable to raise the market value of her human 
capital through investing in her own education.  The rational employee will 
not invest in firm-specific human capital because those skills have no value 
outside of that firm.  Thus, employees will have the incentive to self-invest 
when it comes to general skills, because these are skills they will take from 
one job to another.64  This is because the general human capital created at 
the expense of the individual is an excludible good that the worker controls 
and “owns” outright without concern that the employer can claim owner-
ship rights in those skills. 
However, once a firm has decided to acquire from the marketplace an 
employee already possessing general skills, it encounters a difficult “Catch-
22”—the desired skills are particularly expensive, in a broad sense, to ac-
quire.  The question arises:  Is there a way to protect, and thus encourage, 
investments in general human capital at the individual employee level?65  
While not a commodity or raw material like types of physical capital, hu-
man capital is indeed “purchased” by firms—although temporarily and with 
moral and legal restraints.66  The terms of human capital usage can be nego-
tiated and put into a formal written contract by the firm.  The common 
 63. The mention of efficiency in this case refers to the general idea that firms will act rationally to 
maximize profits. This is to be distinguished from the efficiency of selectively enforcing covenants not 
to compete to maximize the specific private and overall public good, which is the focus of Part VI of this 
Article.  In that latter sense, efficiency is a surrogate for maximizing public goods and outcomes in the 
form of economic prosperity through a more refined, targeted noncompete public policy. 
 64. See Rubin & Shedd, supra note 51, at 96. 
 65. A related issue not addressed here is differences that come with group human capital invest-
ments, particularly the complications of investing in a group (i.e., a team of workers).  For a discussion 
of human capital investment in teams, turnover costs and related issues, see ROBERT A. HART & 
THOMAS MOUTOS, HUMAN CAPITAL, EMPLOYMENT AND BARGAINING 4-5, 130-156 (1995). 
 66. See Summers, supra note 7 (critiquing the traditional employer and worker relationship in the 
at-will employment context). 
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law’s imperfect solution to the question posed above is to rely on the cove-
nant not to compete. 
Rubin and Shedd explain that it is inefficient for an employer to avoid 
providing expensive training because of a fear that the general human capi-
tal will be misappropriated. 67  They argue that noncompetes “are needed to 
lead to efficient levels of investment in training when the person receiving 
training is unable to pay for the human capital by accepting reduced wag-
es.”68  Rubin and Shedd conclude that such concerns lead to underinvest-
ment that can be addressed by enforceable covenants not to compete.69 
With this initial understanding of the economics underlying human 
capital theory and the impact of noncompete enforcement, the next section 
will address how law and economics theories will impact knowledge spil-
lovers when CNCs are enforced.  The details of CNCs in employment con-
tracts and of the policies that lawmakers should promote—through legisla-
tion and the courts—are the subject of the following Part.  As a threshold 
matter, legal policies have long been recognized as an important part of 
economic growth.70  How responsive the law is to social and market trends 
in economic development and whether the legal framework or the industry 
development comes first, are open questions.71 
B. The Law and Economics Approach to Covenants Not to Compete 
1. Overview of the Approach 
Law and economics scholars simply ask:  Are the legal rules efficient?  
In this analysis, as in others, perspective matters.  What is efficient for an 
employer in this analysis might not be efficient for an individual worker.  
Regarding CNCs, the law and economics analysis has focused on the non-
compete’s ability to foster or protect human capital investment72 and to 
 67. Rubin & Shedd, supra note 51, at 97-99. 
 68. Id. at 99. 
 69. Id. 
 70. The formalization of Law and Economics as an influential discipline and worldview is a tes-
tament to this understanding.  The most influential text in this discipline is arguably Richard A. Posner’s 
Economic Analysis of Law.  For example, Posner writes that: 
Economic analysis can help clarify the controversial role of the common law in the economic 
growth of this country.  The usual view is that the common law helped promote economic de-
velopment in the nineteenth century by adopting a permissive, even facilitative, stance toward 
entrepreneurial activity.  A variant is that it subsidized growth by failing to make industry bear 
all the costs that a genuine commitment to efficiency would have required it to bear. 
POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW, supra note 55, at 276. 
 71. A recent and controversial popular account of urban economic development is RICHARD 
FLORIDA, THE RISE OF THE CREATIVE CLASS (2002) (arguing that recent urban development success 
stories are attributable to knowledge-rich urban creative classes moving to blighted inner-city neighbor-
hoods). 
 72. See Posner et. al, supra note 32, at 1. 
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provide a possible evaluation framework for the courts.73  These assump-
tions are premised on a broad freedom to contract and property rights.74  
Whether by design or by intrinsic logic, these law and economics notions of 
economic efficiency also tend to favor employer inte
How the issue is defined, of course, matters greatly.  For example, Eric 
Posner and George Triantis argue that only generalized training is properly 
covered by a noncompete and that if the restriction is of serious value to the 
parties, a noncompete can be renegotiated at the time a breach would oth-
erwise occur.76  This notion of ex post renegotiation, they argue, allows the 
aggrieved employer, the departing employee, and the new employer to 
come to an efficient settlement whereby each is satisfied with the cost they 
bear.77  In other words, they argue for the courts to resolve disputes with a 
costless solution based on perfect information.  Moreover, they believe that 
agreements covering generalized training should be judicially enforced 
where the cost of post-employment renegotiation is too high for the parties 
to come to their own agreement (i.e., prohibitive transaction costs).78  Their 
point is that predictable contract default rules can best fill in the gaps of 
agreements so that contracting parties need not spell out every contingency 
that they might want covered.79 
Another market-based attempt at a unified law and economics frame-
work argues that noncompetes should always be enforced by the courts un-
less a “market failure” occurs.80  These failures are categorized as:  “(a) im-
perfect (including asymmetric) information; (b) constrained choice; and (c) 
externalities.”81  Essentially the first two concerns are addressed by tradi-
tional contract defenses such as overreaching, fraud, and unconscionability, 
while the third category is akin to the rule of reason applied in a Sherman 
Act antitrust analysis.82 
 73. See generally Mark A. Glick et. al, The Law and Economics of Post-Employment Covenants:   
A Unified Framework, 11 GEO. MASON L. REV. 357, 358-359 (2002) (“The discipline of Law & Eco-
nomics can contribute to a more sound analysis of post-employment restraints by state courts.  By pro-
viding a uniform theory through which post-employment covenants might be analyzed, Law & Econom-
ics analysis holds promise in fostering greater predictability in this realm.”). 
 74. See ALAN HYDE, WORKING IN SILICON VALLEY 85 (2003). 
 75. See, e.g., Ann C. McGinley, Rethinking Civil Rights and Employment at Will:  Toward a Co-
herent National Discharge Policy, 57 OHIO ST. L.J. 1443, 1486-87 (1996) (concluding that the persis-
tence of the at-will employment doctrine and the resistance to anti-discrimination statutes is due, in part, 
to law and economics arguments about economically rational employer behavior). 
 76. Posner & Triantis, supra note 52, at 16. 
 77. Id. 
 78. Id. 
 79. See A. MITCHELL POLINSKY, AN INTRODUCTION TO LAW AND ECONOMICS 27 (2nd ed. 1989). 
 80. Glick et. al, supra note 73. 
 81. Id. at 417-18. 
 82. Id. at 418 (concluding that, although the Sherman Act analysis has been infrequently applied 
to noncompetes, it is “increasingly attractive and relevant” because of “the rising importance of high-
technology industries”). 
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Others simply argue that noncompetes are not anti-competitive per se, 
and should not receive even the special treatment and scrutiny they do cur-
rently under most states’ reasonableness test.83  This is because fears of em-
ployer overreaching are perhaps exaggerated when it comes to an examina-
tion of reported cases.84  Similarly, noncompetes are also defended on the 
grounds that they help economic efficiency and growth because they protect 
legitimate employer interests and therefore provide the security that allows 
employers to invest in valuable generalized training.  Essentially, the argu-
ment is that without noncompetes there would be less of an incentive for 
firms to invest in employees.85 
Less expansive, but consistent with part of the law and economics out-
come, is an argument from some commentators that restrictive employment 
covenants should only be enforced to the extent that they cover trade secrets 
misappropriation.86  This argument is less comprehensive, but still consis-
tent with the law and economics view.  Another view is that noncompetes, 
and not shirking of trade secret rights enforcement by employers or weak 
trade secret protection, are the best structural explanation of why there is 
abundant employee mobility and information.87  Still other academics 
perceive a burgeoning psychological contract in the new, dynamic 
 83. See Maureen B. Callahan, Comment, Post-Employment Restraint Agreements:  A Reassess-
ment, 52 U. CHI. L. REV. 703 (1985).  Ms. Callahan argues that: 
The reasonableness approach to post-employment restraint agreements, which is contrary to 
the general rule that courts will not examine the substantive fairness of contract terms, has re-
mained virtually unchanged since 1711, although the stated rationales for this approach no 
longer withstand analysis. Post-employment restraint agreements are not anticompetitive per 
se, and in fact may foster competition by affording employers needed protection for confiden-
tial business information or investments in training. The fact that such agreements are most 
likely to be used with high-level employees and in industries involving complex technologies 
suggests that employer overreaching is not pervasive enough to warrant special treatment of 
these contracts as a class. And, finally, because of social and economic changes, there is little 
likelihood that these agreements exact significant societal costs. Because contracts that are an-
ticompetitive can be invalidated under the antitrust laws, and because the doctrine of uncons-
cionability could adequately protect vulnerable employees, employer excesses can be re-
strained without incurring the economic and social costs of continuing to apply the [traditional 
reasonableness] analysis. 
Id. at 727-28. 
 84. Id. 
 85. See, e.g., id. at 714-15 (dismissing the employee protection rationale for barring noncompetes 
and arguing that noncompetes are efficient in that they lower the cost of products by lowering an input 
cost, thus lowering the cost of production and the cost of producing information). 
 86. See generally Phillip J. Closius & Henry M. Schaffer, Involuntary Nonservitude:  The Current 
Judicial Enforcement of Employee Covenants Not To Compete—A Proposal for Reform, 57 S. CAL. L. 
REV. 531 (1984).  Closius and Schaffer argue that noncompetes are restraints on trade because they re-
strict employee mobility and choice and that the protection of trade secrets through agency law is suffi-
cient to prevent information misuse.  Id.  This is arguably the state of affairs in California where without 
any post-employment noncompete enforcement the state may have a heightened willingness to deter 
trade secret misappropriation. 
 87. See Gilson, supra note 8, at 610-13 (rejecting Hyde’s assertion that California’s trade secret 
protection is necessarily weaker than other states); but see Hyde, supra note 19, at 31 (“Silicon Valley 
therefore owes its existence to the reticence of employers to enforce their rights under trade secret 
law.”). 
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workplace that tacitly grants employees the ability to gain new skills and 
have great mobility amongst firms (as opposed to a now seemingly archaic 
lifelong, single-firm career); this trend precludes noncompete enforcement 
except in the case of trade secrets.88  Other novel approaches are also possi-
ble.89 
2.  Implications for Knowledge Transfer 
While the goal and intent of the law and economics critique is to foster 
the most efficient results, the outcome is that the employer is favored at the 
expense of employee mobility.90  As a result, knowledge transfer from de-
parting employees to other firms is, by design, inhibited by covenant not to 
compete enforcement.  Knowledge spillover is thus less likely to happen in 
that manner because when employees are mobile and move to other firms 
they take tacit information with them,91 but by definition noncompetes limit 
mobility.  The obvious alternative is that with the increased willingness of 
an employer to invest in general human capital there is an increased possi-
bility of knowledge generation and value at the firm level.92  This in turn 
may be of great benefit to internal spillover among firm departments be-
cause of increased internal human capital and longer employee tenure.93 
A potential drawback from decreased knowledge spillovers due to de-
creased employee mobility is that technological innovation may suffer.94  
 88. Stone, supra note 17; see also Katherine V.W. Stone, The New Psychological Contract:  Im-
plications of the Changing Workplace for Labor and Employment Law, 48 UCLA L. REV. 519 (2001).  
For a similar argument that New York must adapt its reasonableness standards to accommodate the fast-
paced world of high-tech employment, see Messeloff, supra note 20. 
 89. One such suggestion made in the defense of noncompete-like restraints is the English idea of 
“garden leave”—a provision that, after an employment relationship ends, the employee stops actively 
working for the firm, but retains all her salary and benefits for the noncompete period, during which she 
is prohibited from working for a competitor.  See Greg T. Lembrich, Note, Garden Leave:  A Possible 
Solution to the Uncertain Enforceability of Restrictive Employment Covenants, 102 COLUM. L. REV. 
2291 (2002) (arguing that garden leave is increasingly used in the United States (although judicially un-
tested), yet the idea seems only to apply to very highly valued employees and not many of the em-
ployees throughout the workforce who currently work under noncompetes); but see Callahan, supra note 
83 and accompanying text.  Callahan argues that despite some of the uncertainty of enforcement that 
accompanies noncompetes, garden leave might not be as effective in stopping employee unfair competi-
tion.  Callahan, supra note 83.  Essentially, the employee is free to relax at home in their garden and still 
collect a paycheck, but they are not allowed to compete against the former employer.  It also suffers 
from the traditional restraint of trade and employee protection problems attributed to conventional non-
competes. 
 90. Posner et. al, supra note 32, at 1-3 (noting that encouraging employer general human capital 
investment is in conflict with employee mobility). 
 91. See Gilson, supra note 8, at 585-86. 
 92. See Rubin & Shedd, supra note 51, at 99. 
 93. It will also benefit industries where confidentiality of information not rising to the level of 
trade secrets is subject to other legal protection.  Id. at 105-07. 
 94. See Posner et. al, supra note 32 (suggesting, theoretically, that one way to reconcile labor mo-
bility and employer protection and incentives to invest in human capital is to introduce ex post renegot-
iation whereby the three parties involved in a CNC dispute can achieve an efficient outcome by agreeing 
on the cost of the employee’s transfer from one employer to another). 
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Essentially, if the law and economics approach prevails, then CNCs are 
more likely to be enforced, leading to greater employer investment protec-
tion.  However, this risks creating a chilling effect on innovation because of 
less employee mobility.  The benefits of disallowing CNC enforcement for 
the sake of mobility and the attendant knowledge spillovers are discussed 
the next section. 
C. Labor Mobility and Covenants Not to Compete 
1. Overview of the Approach and the Silicon Valley Example 
Enforceable employment contracts are, by design, attempts to restrict 
the mobility of a worker during the period of employment.95  In addition, 
the common law doctrine of employee Duty of Loyalty also provides mini-
mum standards to define what a current employee who has freely chosen to 
sell his or her labor at that moment can and cannot do with regard to a 
firm’s competitor during the term of employment.96  However, the contract 
provision specifically intended to restrict an employee’s mobility to a com-
petitor after employment ends is the covenant not to compete. 
Ronald Gilson97 and Alan Hyde98 are at the forefront of advocating the 
model of labor mobility under a legal infrastructure that, among other 
things, disallows CNCs.  In Hyde’s nomenclature, mobility in the know-
ledge economy creates “high-velocity” labor markets.99  While Gilson be-
lieves that a state’s willingness to ban CNCs is a key driver of mobility, 
Hyde discounts the impact of a noncompete-free jurisdiction, although he 
does consider the lack of noncompete enforcement to be part of the legal 
infrastructure that allows for mobility.100  For both Gilson and Hyde the 
touchstone benefit of mobility is the knowledge spillover that occurs when 
employees move between firms, taking tacit knowledge with them to the 
new employer and allowing for more rapid innovation, particularly in the 
high-tech sector. 
The next step is to view these arguments for eliminating CNCs to pro-
mote employee mobility in the context of California law as an often-cited 
paragon of the knowledge-economy.  The enormous success of Silicon Val-
ley as the premier global high-tech region has been studied from various 
 95. Id. 
 96. See Benjamin Aaron & Matthew Finkin, The Law of Employee Loyalty in the United States, 
20 COMP. LAB. L. & POL’Y 321 (1999). 
 97. See Gilson, supra note 8. 
 98. See Hyde, supra note 19; HYDE, supra note 74.  Hyde believes that much of Silicon Valley’s 
success can be attributed to California’s law on trade secrets and the areas entrepreneurial spirit and 
“high-velocity” labor market, as well as California’s policy against noncompetes. 
 99. HYDE, supra note 74. 
 100. Id. at 32-33. 
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perspectives, including from urban planning and sociological viewpoints.101  
Gilson102 and Hyde103 have compared the legal framework of California’s 
Silicon Valley with the high-tech labor markets in states that allow non-
competes.  Hyde argues that noncompetes should be banned as in the Cali-
fornia model, because inhibiting employee mobility has deleterious ef-
fects.104  He argues that California’s laws, including its ban on 
noncompetes, have facilitated a “high-velocity” labor market where em-
ployees move quickly between jobs or simply remain independent contrac-
tors; thus, technical information and innovation are shared quickly, without 
restrictions105 and are “porous to outside influence.”106  Hyde concludes that 
these factors are the key to Silicon Valley’s success and that noncompetes 
are part of the reason why high-tech industries have not flourished to the 
same extent in a state like Massachusetts where CNCs are enforced.107 
Gilson’s analysis explores the difference between Route 128 outside of 
Boston and California’s Silicon Valley in applying CNC policy to prac-
tice.108  He concludes that, in addition to the factors Hyde points out, there 
is an important industry agglomeration effect at play because Silicon Valley 
is a high-technology industrial district.109  He points out that there has been 
a resurgence in scholarly interest in studying agglomeration economies, 
which are essentially spatially connected industries.110  The particular high-
 101. See ANNALEE SAXENIAN, REGIONAL ADVANTAGE:  CULTURE AND COMPETITION IN SILICON 
VALLEY AND ROUTE 128 (1994) (providing a well-regarded urban planning and sociological perspective 
explaining Silicon Valley’s growth as the world’s premier high-tech regional economy).  Other recent 
social science books exploring the intricacies of the Silicon Valley agglomeration economy include:    
THE SILICON VALLEY EDGE (Chong-Moon Lee et. al eds., 2000) (an overview of Silicon Valley’s entre-
preneurial atmosphere for economic growth); UNDERSTANDING SILICON VALLEY:  THE ANATOMY OF 
AN ENTREPRENEURIAL REGION (Martin Kenney, ed. 2000) (evaluating Silicon Valley from an industry 
agglomeration perspective); DAVID ROSENBERG, CLONING SILICON VALLEY:  THE NEXT GENERATION 
HIGH-TECH HOTSPOTS (2002) (a business reporter’s evaluation of high-tech regions in light of the Sili-
con Valley experience); DAVID NAGUIB PELLOW & LISA SUN-HEE PARK, THE SILICON VALLEY OF 
DREAMS (2002) (a critique of the negative externalities of high-tech economic growth in relation to the 
environment and immigrant workers). 
 102. See Gilson, supra note 8. 
 103. See HYDE, supra note 74 (contending that much of Silicon Valley’s success can be attributed 
to California’s law on trade secrets and the areas entrepreneurial spirit and “high-velocity” labor market, 
as well as California’s policy against noncompetes). 
 104. Id. 
 105. See FRBSF ECONOMIC LETTER, No. 2002-24, ON THE MOVE:  CALIFORNIA EMPLOYMENT 
LAW AND HIGH-TECH DEVELOPMENT 1, 3 (2002) (a Federal Reserve economist finding quantitative 
evidence that “suggests that Silicon Valley’s success may derive in part from some unique features of 
California employment law”). 
 106. Gilson, supra note 8, at 591. 
 107. HYDE, supra note 74, at 33; see also Saxenian, supra note 101 (supporting Gilson and Hyde 
by taking an urban planning approach to the issue and concluding that much of Silicon Valley’s success 
(as compared to the Boston area’s Route 128 stagnation) is attributable to the small and dynamic entre-
preneurial firms of the former and the large, unwieldy traditional firms ingrained in the later). 
 108. See Gilson, supra note 8. 
 109. Id. at 586-592. 
 110. Id. at 575. 
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tech “culture” with the easy access to jobs and the ease of mobility between 
firms located in the same regions are connected to the rise and continued 
success of Silicon Valley.  Gilson concludes that other areas should not 
view Silicon Valley as providing a legal framework that is an easy road 
map for economic success, but rather that caution is in order because each 
regional business area is unique.111 
It is worth noting that risk of employer backlash from a CNC-free ju-
risdiction (one without CNCs as a form of human capital investment protec-
tion) has not materialized within Silicon Valley, despite California’s ban on 
noncompetes.112  If California’s ban increases mobility at the expense of 
human capital investment, why would the much-admired knowledge-based 
high-tech world of Silicon Valley be so vibrant and profitable when firms 
are less able to protect their investment?  One possible answer is that, on the 
scale of an agglomeration economy the size of Silicon Valley, the regional 
advantages that formed that particular agglomeration economy are unique 
and simply cannot be replicated.113  This is because, in contrast to the Route 
128 high-tech economy around Boston, Massachusetts (a state that enforces 
CNCs under a reasonableness analysis114), Silicon Valley’s growth was 
enabled by many systematic factors, such as post-WWII government in-
vestment in research and vibrant university partners, and intangibles, such 
as a culture in which business failures were viewed as a positive step in the 
evolution of high-tech entrepreneurs.115 
Silicon Valley’s impressive success as a region is, thus, in many cru-
cial ways attributable to factors beyond the legal framework of covenants 
not to compete.116  The most thorough CNC discussion of the Silicon Val-
ley and Route 128 comparison is Gilson’s.117  He concludes that Silicon 
 111. Id. at 627-29.  As Professor Gilson advises: 
Thus, it may well be that a state concerned with regional development today should not blind-
ly seek to replicate the historical source of Silicon Valley’s success. Given the opportunity to 
act by design rather than by historical accident, the better approach may be to craft a legal in-
frastructure that has the flexibility to accommodate the different balance between external 
economies and intellectual property rights protection that may be optimal in different indus-
tries. In contrast, for California, where the industrial distribution already reflects the long-term 
presence of Business and Professions Code Section 16600, the best course may simply be 
staying the course. 
Id. at 629. 
 112. See HYDE, supra note 74, at 43 (concluding that there is no ascertainable social harm to the 
state—including no evidence of a lack of employer investment in information production—because of 
what he sees as weak trade secret protection and a ban on noncompetes). 
 113. Saxenian, supra note 101.  Saxenian is also compelled to point out the uniqueness of Silicon 
Valley, noting that “while the institutions in other regional network-based systems may offer broad tem-
plates for policymakers, a regional industrial strategy will work only if it is tailored to the specific prob-
lems and conditions of the particular locality and its industrial community.”  Id. at 167. 
 114. See O’Malley, supra note 20. 
 115. Saxenian, supra note 101. 
 116. Id. (identifying cultural aspects of Silicon Valley high-tech employees that made information 
exchange and innovation more possible than near Boston’s Route 128 region). 
 117. See Gilson, supra note 8. 
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Valley’s legal infrastructure provided the initial conditions for the region’s 
continuously evolving second-stage agglomeration economy.118  Gilson also 
demonstrates that California’s ban is based on a historical quirk of lawmak-
ing, and not a recent or intentional human capital-based policy.119 
2. Implications for Knowledge Transfer 
Covenants not to compete are in tension with fostering employee mo-
bility and knowledge spillovers that encourage innovation in the high-tech 
arena.120  It is particularly attractive to ban, or severely limit, noncompetes 
in the high-tech sector, where the uninhibited exchange of ideas can lead to 
innovation from information spillovers.  Departing employees are likely to 
take knowledge to firms in the same industry where they, and their new 
firms, will benefit from the general human capital the employee honed 
elsewhere.121  Without the specter of a noncompete, employers are more 
likely to hire away employees from other firms, precisely for the expertise 
they will bring.  One of Hyde’s main arguments is that increased mobility 
will create smaller, more agile firms, including start-ups, which have a 
greater tendency to innovate and grow at a “higher velocity” than larger, es-
tablished firms.122 
It is also possible, however, that knowledge sharing could be harmed 
by high-velocity labor markets characterized by rapid turnover.  A truly 
mobile knowledge-based workforce can harm the interests of the firms in-
vesting in creating knowledge.123  Such a system can produce a backlash 
from firms that are unwilling to lose a knowledge advantage.  That backlash 
could come in several forms, such as revoking of employer retirement con-
tributions to ERISA plans124 or lobbying for more expansive trade secret 
protection.  As mentioned above in the discussion of the law and economics 
approach, CNCs can be efficient in fostering general human capital invest-
ments from firms because the existence of a noncompete can raise the op-
portunity cost for a worker contemplating leaving for a competitor.  In a ju-
risdiction without CNC enforcement there is a greater risk that higher 
mobility could result in less overall general human capital investment and 
thus less “public good” from a highly skilled workforce.  This ease of mo-
 118. Id. at 619-620. 
 119. Id. 
 120. Posner et. al, supra note 32, at 1. 
 121. See HYDE, supra note 74, at 29. 
 122. Id. at 15-19 (discussing Silicon Valley high-tech start-up companies). 
 123. See Yuval Feldman, Experimental Approach to the Study of Normative Failures:  Divulging of 
Trade Secrets by Silicon Valley Employees, 2003 U. ILL. J.L. TECH. & POL’Y 105 (2003) (concluding 
that California trade secrets protection is an insufficient deterrent to trade secret sharing by Silicon Val-
ley employees). 
 124. See, e.g., Robert W. Hillman, Ties that Bind and Restraints on Lawyer Competition:  Restric-
tive Covenants as Conditions to the Payment of Retirement Benefits, 39 IND. L. REV. 1 (2005). 
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bility will intuitively reduce an employee’s feelings of loyalty to any single 
employer. 
D. The Employee Rights Approach to Covenants Not to Compete 
1. Overview of the Approach 
Some commentators who criticize noncompetes outright on grounds 
other than inefficiency argue that CNCs limit the rights of workers to exclu-
sively control how their labor is directed.125  These arguments emphasize 
the unfair competition aspects that underlie the judicial public policy di-
lemma of whether noncompetes are legitimate contracts not unduly restrict-
ing trade.  Abolishment proponents argue that noncompetes should not be 
enforced because:  (1) they restrain trade and keep important information 
from the public, (2) they can cause an overall loss to society by depriving it 
of valuable services, and (3) employees have unequal bargaining power and 
need protection to ensure their ability to pursue a chosen livelihood and 
mobility.126 
Professor Katherine Stone argues that there is a “new psychological 
contract” between employers and workers, in contrast to the traditional im-
plicit contract for lifetime employment and human capital investment from 
a single firm.127  The new contract is characterized by an understanding that 
lifetime employment and internal firm labor markets for promotion are no 
longer possible, and so in exchange for continued employee loyalty em-
ployers will invest in the general human capital of workers.128  Workers 
will, thus, still gain valuable, marketable skills and networks from the ar-
rangement and be free to take those attributes with them when they move 
on to other firms.  Covenants not to compete are, therefore, a violation of 
this new psychological contract in that the employer seeks to protect its in-
vestment by cutting back on employees’ mobility and free use of know-
 125. See, e.g., Stone, supra note 17. 
 126. See Callahan, supra note 83, at 711-24. 
 127. Stone, supra note 17, at 739-46.  However, the traditional American rule of at-will employ-
ment represents a deviation from this model and even a safety valve of sorts for an employer needing to 
cut labor costs.  As one author has vividly described at-will employment: 
The assumption is that the employee is only a supplier of labor who has no legal interest or 
stake in the enterprise other than the right to be paid for labor performed.  The employer, as 
owner of the enterprise, is legally endowed with the sole right to determine all matters con-
cerning the operation of the enterprise.  This includes the work performed and the continued 
employment of its employees.  The law, by giving total dominance to the employer, endows 
the employer with the divine right to rule the working lives of its subject employees. 
Summers, supra note 7, at 65. 
 128. In reality there may be little awareness of many workers about their rights under employment 
law and the nature of their at-will employment.  See, e.g., Pauline T. Kim, Bargaining with Imperfect 
Information:  A Study of Worker Perceptions of Legal Protection in an At-Will World, 83 CORNELL L. 
REV. 105 (1997) (concluding that, in fact, many workers are unaware of the at-will nature of their em-
ployment and the lack of default job protection available). 
314 BERKELEY JOURNAL OF EMPLOYMENT & LABOR LAW Vol. 27:2 
 
ledge (i.e., general human capital).129  This approach emphasizes the sove-
reignty of the employee and challenges the firm’s ability to control the in-
dividual’s labor post-employment. 
2. Implications for Knowledge Transfer 
Under the employee rights model, the outcomes for human capital in-
vestment and employee mobility are similar to the outcomes of the pure 
employee mobility approach.  This theory, however, is applied to all work-
ers, unlike the high-velocity labor market model that addresses mobility on-
ly in the high-tech, knowledge economy.  While highly educated employees 
with a great deal of employer-provided human capital will bring positive 
knowledge spillovers to a subsequent employer in the same industry, the 
valuable spillover is less likely to occur with workers having less aggregate 
human capital. 
This theory, nonetheless, explains part of the rationale for why the in-
fluential state of California continues to ban noncompetes.  California poli-
cy embodied in the anti-noncompete statute is not rooted in a desire to pro-
mote worker mobility in Silicon Valley’s high-tech sector; rather, it is 
rooted in a concern for employee autonomy.130  The state’s courts, in fact, 
express the public policy of Section 16600 in terms that echo the sentiments 
of the employee rights approach, stating that California has a “strong public 
policy against noncompetition agreements under section 16600”131 because 
that policy “protects Californians, and ensures ‘that every citizen shall re-
tain the right to pursue any lawful employment and enterprise of their 
choice’ [and it] protects’the important legal right of persons to engage in 
businesses and occupations of their choosing.’”132  Similarly, the statute “is 
an expression of [California’s] strong public policy in favor of open compe-
tition and the right of its citizens to pursue the enterprise of their choice.”133 
An employee rights model of addressing noncompetes tends toward 
banning noncompetes under an equity rationale, in line with the autonomy 
public policy justification articulated by the California courts.  Accordingly, 
the practical result would be similar to the employee mobility model and 
knowledge spillovers developed by Gilson and Hyde and discussed above.  
However, the employee rights approach does not come to the same analyti-
cal conclusion that innovation is the goal of weakening noncompete en-
 129. Stone, supra note 17, at 739-46. 
 130. See Gilson, supra note 8, at 613-19. 
 131. Advanced Bionics Corp. v. Medtronic, Inc., 29 Cal. 4th 697, 705-706 (2002). 
 132. Id. at 236-37 (quoting Metro Traffic Control, Inc. v. Shadow Traffic Network, 33 Cal. App. 
4th 853, 859 (1994) and Morlife, Inc. v. Perry, 56 Cal. App. 4th 1514, 1520 (1997)). 
 133. Beer & Wine Servs., Inc. v. Dumas, No. B151792, 2003 LEXIS 2556, at *7 (Cal. Ct. App., 
March 17, 2003) (citing Hill Medical Corp. v. Wycoff, 86 Cal. App. 4th 895, 900-01 (2001) and Metro 
Traffic Control, Inc. v. Shadow Traffic Network, 22 Cal. App. 4th 853, 859 (1994)). 
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forcement, rather the ideal promoted by this approach is solely employee 
rights-based. 
IV. 
CREATIVE VERSUS SERVICE EMPLOYEES:   
A DISTINCTION WITHIN THE KNOWLEDGE ECONOMY 
In the debate over human capital and noncompetes, commentators have 
divided general human capital into industry-specific and then firm-specific 
human capital and training.134  This section describes the distinctions be-
tween the types of workers contributing to the knowledge-based economy 
and asserts that their human capital must be treated differently with regard 
to the CNC analysis based on the type of contribution they make.  The divi-
sion will be drawn between “creative” and “service” workers within the 
knowledge economy.135 
Within the context of a knowledge-based economy, “creative” workers 
use their employer-provided human capital to create products used in that 
economy.  Essentially, these workers are valued by firms for their contribu-
tion to marketable innovation.  For example, a creative worker is one who 
works in an engineering capacity, designing computer software, or as a 
chemist, researching new drugs for a pharmaceutical company.  These em-
ployees are characterized by a high level of education, and thus a high level 
of general human capital.  This category includes the high-tech industry 
employees that are appropriately part of the “high-velocity” labor market 
described by Alan Hyde.136 
A second type of worker in the knowledge economy is the “service” 
worker.  Like creative workers, service workers are characterized by a high 
level of education, but they are likely to have a larger amount of firm-
specific human capital.  These workers are engaged primarily in servicing 
other elements of the knowledge economy with their expertise.  Examples 
include investment bankers, stock analysts, journalists, management consul-
tants, trained salespeople at a pharmaceutical company, and service-
providing professionals like physicians.137  These individuals are not en-
gaged in goods manufacturing, rather they use specialized knowledge and a 
 134. See, e.g., Rubin & Shedd, supra note 51. 
 135. If they are in the knowledge economy then, by definition, they are not producing goods in the 
traditional sense, such as making steel or engaging in traditional agricultural activities. 
 136. See HYDE, supra note 74, at 86-87 (describing how Silicon Valley programmers are expected 
to develop their own skills without employer-provided training). 
 137. Technically lawyers would fall into this theoretical category, however attorneys are exempted 
from restrictions on freedom of employment for ethical and public policy reasons, and sometimes spe-
cifically by state statute, from falling under CNC restrictions.  See Hillman, supra note 124, at 1 (focus-
ing on the prospect of tying post-employment noncompetition to the payment of retirement benefits, the 
“one important, but largely undeveloped, exception to the ethics codes’ ban on restrictive covenants” for 
lawyers). 
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large degree of human capital to problem-solve and promote elements of 
the knowledge economy.  Their jobs are fuelled by a high level of human 
capital—both specific and general—and their value is in how they use that 
knowledge to engage in important activities like writing reports, selling 
products, and evaluating corporate stocks.  In other words, they are not 
creating that knowledge per se, rather they are using it to provide valuable 
services.  This category encompasses the sorts of workers contemplated by 
the law and economics approach to human capital investment and noncom-
petes discussed in Part III. 
V. 
TAKE THE BEST, AVOID THE REST:  
RECONCILING CNC THEORIES TO MAXIMIZE MARGINAL BENEFITS 
The theories outlined in Part III all argue from valid points of view.  
They are not, however, inconsistent with each other on their face.  The next 
step is to draw on theories of how covenants not to compete should ideally 
function, minimizing their drawbacks while accentuating their benefits.  
This portion of the Article argues that the purported benefits and efficien-
cies extolled by both ends of the spectrum can lead to a unitary, hybrid 
model. 
As seen in Part III, there are benefits that result from each of the mod-
els.  For the law and economics model, investment in otherwise hard to ac-
quire human capital is encouraged when employers have CNC protection.  
However, the mobility model and the employee rights model would ban 
noncompetes, albeit on different grounds.  The justification for that policy 
is that it increases innovations and knowledge transfer as side effects of 
greater employee mobility and independence from employers. 
The implication is that on the margins of the enforcement spectrum the 
opposing—yet mutually desirable—externalities are maximized.  Specifi-
cally, the beneficial knowledge spillovers that come from the mobility and 
attendant information sharing of not enforcing noncompetes in certain em-
ployment situations are compatible with the benefits of selective enforce-
ment under other circumstances.  If the positive elements of the law and 
economics approach and the employee mobility approaches are accepted as 
persuasive in their own regard, then the best public policy is one that allows 
for the maximization of those positive spillovers. 
The differences can be reconciled in a manner that maximizes the posi-
tive outcomes of both policies with respect to service and creative workers 
in a knowledge-based economy.  By maximizing those positive spillovers 
on the margins, the conflict of the two theories can be reduced and the posi-
tives enhanced.  The key is to treat different types of workers differently 
with respect to CNC enforcement policy.  Simply put, this model challenges 
the assumption that all workers with CNCs should be treated equally under 
a state’s policy framework. 
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To demonstrate how the two theories can be reconciled for overall 
benefit, it is useful to conceive of the opposing models graphically.  The 
following diagrams shows how the theories are, at least in part, in conflict 
in terms of how they relate to varying levels of enforcement.  Specifically, 
Figure 1A illustrates a spectrum showing the levels of possible state en-
forcement (weak, moderate, or strong) of covenants not to compete.  To 
show what elements of a state’s public policy constitute a certain level of 
enforcement, the various protectable interests recognized by jurisdictions’ 
reasonableness tests are placed along the spectrum in order of their extraor-
dinary nature.  For example, all states, even California with its policy of 
non-enforcement, recognize trade secret protection and the employee’s duty 
of loyalty, but only states that vigorously enforce CNCs will extend an em-
ployer’s portfolio of rights to the level of recognizing training and customer 
goodwill as protectable interests.138  Figure 1B introduces the distinction 
between creative and service employees and illustrates how those types of 
workers (and the implications for positive spillovers) are relate to different 
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While the benefits of the opposing mobility and law and economics 
justifications for noncompete policy seem irreconcilable, they are not.  In 
fact, when the creative and service worker categories developed in Part III 
are applied to the benefits sought under each model, it becomes apparent 
that there is actually theoretical convergence regarding the positive out-
 138. See generally Malsberger, supra note 5. 
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comes (spillovers) a CNC policy could promote.  The next diagram (Figure 
2) is a matrix representing the overlap of the two theories and the positive 
spillovers associated with each.  Enforcing a covenant not to compete 
against a creative employee produces a negative result while, to the con-
trary, allowing enforcement of a noncompete against a service worker al-
lows for the positive spillover of increased general human capital invest-
ment. 
The theory shows that, on one hand, if noncompetes are not enforced 
in a given jurisdiction, the model results in a positive spillover of know-
ledge sharing and innovation for creative employees.  On the other hand, if 
noncompetes are not enforced in a jurisdiction there is a negative effect (in-

































































By using these models as an analytical starting point it is possible to 
envision a CNC public policy that maximizes the spillovers possible from 
creative workers or service workers by taking an extreme stance on CNC 
enforcement.  The other alternative—the one that is argued for in this Ar-
ticle—is to attempt to balance the results and maximize the marginal gains 
for both classes of workers.  The next Part discusses these options in detail 
and makes recommendations in light of the preferred policy outcome and 
the economic goals of hypothetical states with differing goals. 
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VI. 
FIFTY WAYS TO LEAVE YOUR EMPLOYER:  
WHAT ARE THE PUBLIC POLICY IMPLICATIONS FOR STATES? 
There is no uniformity in the enforcement of post-employment non-
competition agreements among states.139  There are numerous standards for 
enforcing these agreements, in part or in whole, and there are reasonable 
and numerous standards for voiding them as against public policy, often be-
cause the terms are overbroad.  This section will present recommendations 
for how states should evaluate their policies toward noncompetes in light of 
the models discussed above as they relate to a knowledge economy. 
Each state should clearly lay out its chosen noncompete policy goals 
and formalize them in a piece of legislation that can serve as guidance for 
the parties to an employment agreement, prospective employers, and the 
courts.  Ideally, a CNC statute would provide a set of clear rules about the 
state’s policy and enforcement guidelines.  To ensure an overall fair and 
reasonable application of a CNC policy—whatever model it is based on—
the discretion to apply the policy should be left up to the courts, in part be-
cause the CNC cases are intensely fact specific and must be evaluated on a 
case-by-case basis.  A significant number of states already have CNC en-
forcement statutes of general applicability to all employees,140 and some 
others have specialized ones concerning certain professions.141 
If one accepts that noncompete policy and enforcement guidelines 
should be formalized in a piece of legislation, the next step is to determine 
what policy is most appropriate for a jurisdiction.  To do this one must con-
sider the nature of a particular state’s economic interests.  This paper is 
concerned with how states might adapt their noncompete policies to the 
changing employee-employer relationship and the rising importance of a 
knowledge-based economy as the role of producing goods becomes less 
important.142  Thus, the remainder of this Part’s focus is on what factors a 
state should consider when crafting its noncompete policy, based on its cur-
rent needs and future goals. 
 139. Nor does this issue seem ripe, even remotely, for generalized federal preemption.  For a dis-
cussion of the federal court’s approach to covenants not to compete, particularly in the antitrust context, 
see Glick et. al, supra note 73, at 408-17. 
 140. Specifically, fifteen states (30%) have enacted some sort of statue of general applicability to 
CNCs.  See infra, Appendix, Figure 3. 
 141. See generally Malsberger, supra note 5.  For a discussion of the states that have enacted anti-
CNC legislation regarding broadcaster employee contracts at the insistence of interests representing 
broadcast professionals, see Nancy Morrison O’Connor, Promises and Pye Crusts:  State Statutes 
Threaten Broadcast Noncompetes, COMMUNICATIONS LAWYER 21:3 (2003) (discussing the successful 
state-level lobbying efforts of the American Federation of Television and Radio Artists to ban noncom-
petes for broadcasters). 
 142. See Mandel, supra note 18. 
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A. Mobility Maximizing Public Policy 
A mobility maximizing approach would entail little or no noncompete 
enforcement and is most appropriate for states primarily to create a legal in-
frastructure conducive to knowledge spillovers from a high rate of em-
ployee turnover.  Such a policy would encourage the formation of start-up 
companies in a knowledge economy because it would greatly lower the le-
gal barriers to obtaining general human capital from an established firm and 
then using those skills to start a competing firm.  It would also be, on the 
whole, more employee-friendly than other policies.  As discussed above, 
this policy would most favor multi-firm industries, such as the high-tech in-
dustry, that benefit from high-velocity labor markets.143  However, there is 
also the risk that free-flowing information will lead to the circumvention of 
trade secret laws in an environment like the Silicon Valley high-tech com-
munity.144 
The downside is that this approach is not favored by employers and, as 
a result, would also discourage employer investment in general human capi-
tal.  The interests of traditional financial services industries such as the se-
curities, banking, and insurance sectors would be disfavored by such a poli-
cy.  This is because those businesses require protection of confidential 
information, even when that information does not have trade secret protec-
tion.  For example, service-based enterprises for which it is key to hold con-
fidential client relationships, sales information, and research will be harmed 
by an inability to secure human capital investments and employee loyalty.  
Without noncompete enforcement there is a greater likelihood that a worker 
will leave to work for a competitor or to start a competing enterprise before 
the investment in human capital is recouped by the employer.145  Accor-
dingly, a state wishing to encourage financial services or other knowledge 
service industries would not want a policy that only encouraged employee 
mobilit
In effect this mobility maximizing approach is the policy of Califor-
nia’s Business and Professions Code Section 16600, which is credited with 
creating the proper legal framework for Silicon Valley’s so-called high-
velocity labor market and the resulting technological innovation.146  Unfor-
tunately for other states that want to create a similar high-tech knowledge 
economy, the risk is that Silicon Valley is not so easily replicated,147 in part 
 143. See Hyde, supra note 19; HYDE, supra note 74. 
 144. See Feldman, supra note 123. 
 145. Rubin & Shedd, supra note 51, at 96. 
 146. See HYDE, supra note 74. 
 147. See Gilson, supra note 8, at 629 (concluding that a state concerned with regional development 
“should not blindly seek to replicate[] the historical source of silicon Valley’s success,” and that “the 
better approach may be to craft a legal infrastructure that has the flexibility to accommodate the different 
balance between external economies and intellectual property rights protection that may be optimal in 
different industries”). 
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because so many extralegal factors are involved.  The drawbacks of disal-
lowing CNCs might outweigh the benefits of a policy that encourages a po-
tentially small economic driver, especially when the economy is in the ini-
tial stages of industry agglomeration.148 
B. Knowledge Services Maximizing Public Policy 
In contrast to the previous recommendations, a knowledge services 
maximizing jurisdiction would allow strong noncompete enforcement to 
promote firms—like financial services companies—that require confiden-
tiality and prefer a minimum of knowledge spillover to competitors.  Strong 
enforcement would perhaps include extending protection specifically to 
training, client goodwill, and client contacts.  In this way, such a jurisdic-
tion would enact a statute that, in effect, favors employers desiring to with-
hold information from competitors and the marketplace.  The positive out-
come would be seen in increased general human capital investment because 
that investment would receive legal protection and employers would have 
the comfort of securing their investment.149 
This approach, however, creates obstacles to employee mobility and 
discourages innovation through knowledge exchange among firms.  It is al-
so thus subject to the employee rights critique.150  For both reasons, this 
type of noncompete policy risks alienating employees and pushing away 
valuable creative workers in desirable high-tech firms because those work-
ers will be unable to move between firms and acquire transferable human 
capital in the process.  A jurisdiction choosing this path will have to make a 
policy decision to favor larger, more knowledge service-based firms.  Such 
a policy is appropriate for a state like New York that has a stated interest in 
protecting the existing agglomeration economy of Wall Street investment 
banks and other financial service industries located in the New York City 
area.  While certainly any state, New York included, cannot risk concentrat-
ing on only one type of industry to the exclusion of others, the importance 
of confidential knowledge, or alternatively the sharing of knowledge 
through the mechanism of employee mobility, should be a factor that policy 
makers seriously consider when shaping noncompete policies. 
C. A Model Hybrid Jurisdiction 
A state adopting the model hybrid approach would maximize the mar-
ginal positive spillovers presented in Part V.  Specifically, it would treat 
CNCs for workers in the knowledge-based economy differently depending 
 148. See Gilson, supra note 8, at 592 (discussing the unique factors Saxenian cites for Silicon Val-
ley’s prosperity and how those factors gave rise to a second-stage agglomeration economy not present 
with Route 128). 
 149. See, e.g., Posner and Triantis, supra note 52. 
 150. Stone, supra note 17. 
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on whether the worker is a service or a creative employee.  This model pol-
icy for CNCs does not presently exist in any state. 
Of the three models discussed in this part, this is the most complicated 
to implement because, by design, it requires another layer of analysis and 
the risks that come with giving more discretion in decision-making to the 
courts.  With this model, a court evaluating a CNC dispute would have to 
first determine if the employee at issue is properly categorized as a covered 
“service” worker, or instead a “creative” worker not subject to CNC en-
forcement.  One can imagine that this inquiry might be rather complicated 
because some job descriptions might cover both creative and service as-
pects.  However, that uncertainty will also encourage employers and em-
ployees to categorize the employee’s duties ex ante and make that determi-
nation part of the covenant. 
The hybrid option attempts to maximize the benefits of each policy at 
the extremes by drawing distinctions within the labor market in a know-
ledge economy.  In turn, this requires a delicate balance in the way know-
ledge service workers and creative workers are defined.  One way to get 
that balance is to create a metric, such as gross salary or rank in the corpo-
rate structure, as a means to establish a sliding scale of accepted noncom-
pete boundaries.  While such line drawing may be difficult, such an ap-
proach is not without precedent.  One state, Colorado, chose to enact a 
detailed statute that makes covenants not to compete illegal—complete with 
criminal sanctions—except for certain specific permissible situations that 
provide guidance to the courts.151 
The Colorado exceptions are for “contractual provision[s] providing 
for recovery of the expense of educating and training an employee who has 
served an employer for a period of less than two years” and “[e]xecutive 
and management personnel and officers and employees who constitute pro-
fessional staff to executive and management personnel.”152  The latter pro-
vision is essentially an attempt to allow selective noncompete enforcement 
for a segment of the labor force.  While the legislative intent is unclear, the 
implicit justification for allowing noncompetes for management workers is 
presumably that those employees are already relatively well compensated.  
By definition, those employees have a management role in the firm that 
would give them access to confidential information, thus making post-
employment competition by those managers potentially unfair to the former 
employer. 
A state following this hybrid model would draft a statute that, similar 
to Colorado’s detailed approach, provides for noncompete enforcement for 
knowledge service workers as a means of encouraging human capital de-
velopment in industries that require employers to invest large amounts in 
 151. COLO. REV. STAT. § 8-2-113 (2005); see supra note 5. 
 152. Id. § 8-2-113(c)-(d). 
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confidential information and client relationships.  The reverse would be true 
for creative knowledge employees.  There the statute would ban noncom-
pete enforcement to promote innovative, mobile creative service workers.  
Under this hybrid model, confidential information-dependant firms (Wall 
Street) could be protected without disfavoring firms that depend on innova-
tion and mobility (Silicon Valley). 
This model focuses on the nature of the employee’s work, not simply 
the industry in which he or she is employed, and it obviously allows for a 
single firm to employ both knowledge-based creative and service workers 
and to treat them differently when deciding if a noncompete is advanta-
geous or appropriate.  Rather than seeming to treat different categories of 
employees unfairly by treating them differently, the firm would have the 
ability, as it does under any CNC system, to limit access to information to 
certain employees. 
This policy would also force employers to choose which employees 
fall into which category.  This may allow for employer overreaching; how-
ever, the ability to discriminate amongst different work functions in order to 
selectively apply noncompete enforcement would be useful for many states 
that do not have, for example, California’s already developed high-tech 
economy.  In that sense this model allows a jurisdiction to hedge its eco-
nomic development bets.  Ideally a state can encourage new creative know-
ledge workers to come to its cities or stem the tide of a so-called “brain 
drain” by allowing creative employees to have the ability to move easily be-
tween firms, taking general human capital with them, and innovate.  Simul-
taneously, knowledge economy service workers and their employers will 
benefit from the human capital investment provided by a legal framework 
that allows limited covenant not to compete enforcement.  The result is that 
both the positive spillovers from mobility and from encouraging human 
capital investment are facilitated to the aggregate benefit of a state’s eco-
nomic development goals. 
VII. 
CONCLUSION 
There is no one-size-fits-all framework for how a state should develop 
its public policy concerning the enforcement of covenants not to compete.  
It should also be clear that there are challenges to producing a noncompete 
policy embodied in a statute and intended to differentiate between service 
workers and creative workers in a knowledge economy.  However, the ex-
isting approaches of complete non-enforcement of CNCs on one hand, and 
complicated enforcement under a reasonableness test on the other, generate 
negative effects whereby only one positive spillover is encouraged at a giv-
en time, at the expense of other beneficial outcomes. 
This leads to the conclusion that the approach represented by the hybr-
id model is superior to either the pure mobility or pure knowledge services 
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models.  This is because those two models are “all or nothing” approaches 
where only one element of positive spillover is encouraged.  The hybrid ap-
proach, in contrast, seeks to maximize both positive elements by selectively 
applying noncompete enforcement in the hopes of pleasing both Wall Street 
and Silicon Valley.  This is not merely an argument that states can have it 
both ways.  Rather it is a means to, at a minimum, encourage states to think 
about the spillovers their policies create as they develop long-term plans for 
how to utilize covenants not to compete as a tool to help secure a leading 
role in a knowledge-based economy. 
 
APPENDIX 
(The raw research used to compile this map is derived from 
COVENANTS NOT TO COMPETE, A STATE-BY-STATE SURVEY (Brian M. 
Malsberger ed., 2004); KURT H. DECKER, COVENANTS NOT TO COMPETE 
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